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Abstract. In order for personal assistant agents in an ambient intelligence con-
text to provide good recommendations, or pro-actively support humans in task 
allocation, a good model of what the human prefers is essential. One aspect that 
can be considered to tailor this support to the preferences of humans is trust. 
This measurement of trust should incorporate the notion of relativeness since a 
personal assistant agent typically has a choice of advising substitutable options. 
In this paper such a model for relative trust is presented, whereby a number of 
parameters can be set that represent characteristics of a human. 
1   Introduction 
Nowadays, more and more ambient systems are being deployed to support humans in 
an effective way [1], [2] and [3]. An example of such an ambient system is a personal 
agent that monitors the behaviour of a human executing certain complex tasks, and 
gives dedicated support for this. Such support could include advising the use of a 
particular information source, system or agent to enable proper execution of the task, 
or even involving such a system or agent pro-actively. In order for these personal 
agents to be accepted and useful, the personal agent should be well aware of the hab-
its and preferences of the human it is supporting. If a human for example dislikes 
using a particular system or agent, and there are several alternatives available that are 
more preferred, the personal agent would not be supporting effectively if it would 
advise, or even pro-actively initiate, the disliked option. 
An aspect that plays a crucial role in giving such tailored advice is to represent the 
trust levels the human has for certain options. Knowing these trust values allows the 
personal assistant to reason about these levels, and give the best possible support that 
is in accordance with the habits and preferences of the human. Since there would be 
no problem in case there is only one way of supporting the human, the problem of 
selecting the right support method only occurs in case of substitutable options. There-
fore, a notion of relative trust in these options seems more realistic than having a 
separate independent trust value for each of these options. For instance, if three sys-
tems or agents can contribute X, and two of them perform bad, whereas the third 
performs pretty bad as well, but somewhat better in than the others, your trust in that 
third option may still be a bit high since in the context of the other options it is the 
best alternative. The existing trust models do however not explicitly handle such 
relative trust notions [4] and [5]. 
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This paper introduces an approach to model relative trust. In this model, a variety 
of different parameters can be set to fully tailor this trust model towards the human 
being supported. These aspects include initial trust and distrust, the weighing of posi-
tive and negative experiences, and the weight of past experiences. The model is repre-
sented by means of differential equations to also enable a formal analysis of the  
proposed model. Experiments have been conducted with a variety of settings to show 
what the influence of the various parameters is upon the trust levels. 
This paper is organised as follows. First, in Section 2 the model is explained. Next, 
Section 3 presents a number of simulation results. In Section 4 the model is used to 
compare different cultures with each other. Section 5 presents a formal analysis of the 
model. Finally, Section 6 is a discussion. 
2   Modelling Dynamics of Trust of Competitive Trustees 
This section proposes a model that caters the dynamics of a human’s trust on comp-
etitive trustees. In this model trust of the human on a trustee depends on the relative 
experiences with the trustee in comparison to the experiences from all of the 
competitive trustees. The model defines the total trust of the human as the difference 
between positive trust and negative trust (distrust) on the trustee. It includes personal 
human characteristics like trust decay, flexibility, and degree of autonomy (context-
independence) of the trust. Figure 1 shows the dynamic relationships in the proposed 
model.  
Trust Decay
Trust Autonomy
Human
CT1
CT2
CTn
Trust Flexibility
 
Fig. 1. Trust-based interaction with n competitive trustees (information agents IA) 
In this model it is assumed that the human is bound to request one of the available 
competitive trustees at each time step. The probability of the human’s decision to 
request one of the trustees {CT1, CT2, . . . CTn} at time t is based on the trust value 
{T1, T2, . . . Tn} for each CTi respectively at time t. In the response of the human’s 
request CTi gives experience value (Ei(t)) from the set {-1, 1} which means a negative 
and positive experience respectively. This experience is used to update the trust value 
for the next time point. Besides {-1, 1} the experience value can also be 0, indicating 
that CTi gives no experience to the human at time point t. 
 Modeling Dynamics of Relative Trust of Competitive Information Agents 57 
2.1   Parameters Characterising Individual Differences between Humans 
To tune the model to specific personal human characteristics a number of parameters 
are used.  
Flexibility β. The personality attribute called trust flexibility (β) is a number between 
[0, 1] that represents in how far the trust level at time point t will be adapted when 
human has a (positive or negative) experience with a trustee. If this factor is high then 
the human will give more weight to the experience at t+Δ t than the already available 
trust at t to determine the new trust level for t+Δ t and vice versa. 
Trust Decay γ . The human personality attribute called trust decay (γ) is a number 
between [0, 1] that represents the rate of trust decay of the human on the trustee when 
there is no experience. If this factor is high then the human will forget soon about past 
experiences with the trustee and vice versa. 
Autonomy η. The human personality attribute called autonomy (η) is a number 
between [0, 1] that indicates in how far trust is determined independent of trust in 
other options. If the number is high, trust is (almost) independent of other options. 
Initial Trust. The human personality attribute called initial trust indicates the level of 
trust assigned initially to a trustee. 
2.2   Dynamical Models for Relative Trust and Distrust 
The model is composed from two models: one for the positive trust, accumulating 
positive experiences, and one for negative trust, accumulating negative experiences. 
The approach of taking positive and negative trust separately at the same time to 
measure total trust is similar to the approaches taken in literature for degree of belief 
and disbelief [6] and [7]. Both negative and positive trusts are a number between  
[0, 1]. While human total trust at CTi on any time point t is the difference of positive 
and negative trust at CTi at time t. 
Here first the positive trust is addressed. The human’s relative positive trust of CTi 
at time point t is based on a combination of two parts: the autonomous part, and the 
context-dependent part. For the latter part an important indicator is the human’s rela-
tive positive trust of CTi at time point t (denoted by τi+(t)): the ratio of the human’s 
trust of CTi to the average human’s trust on all options at time point t. Similarly an 
indicator for the human’s relative negative trust of CTi at time point t (denoted by τi-
(t)) is the ratio between human’s negative trust of the option CTi and the average 
human’s negative trust on all options at time point t. These are calculated as follows: 
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j j∑ = −1 )( express the average positive and 
negative trust over all options at time point t respectively. The context-dependent part 
was designed in such a way that when the positive trust is above the average, then upon 
each positive experience it gets an extra increase, and when it is below average it gets a 
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decrease. This models a form of competition between the different information agents. 
The principle used is a variant of a ‘winner takes it all’ principle, which for example is 
sometimes modelled by mutually inhibiting neurons representing the different options. 
This principle has been modelled by basing the change of trust upon a positive experi-
ence on τi+(t) – 1, which is positive when the positive trust is above average and negative 
when it is below average. To normalise, this is multiplied by a factor Ti+(t)*(1 – Ti+(t)). 
For the autonomous part the change upon a positive experience is modelled by 1 – Ti+(t).  
As η indicates in how far the human is autonomous or context-dependent in trust attribu-
tion, a weighted sum is taken with weights η and 1-η respectively. Therefore, using the 
parameters defined in above Ti+(t+Δt) is calculated using the following equations. Note 
that here the competition mechanism is incorporated in a dynamical systems approach 
where the values of τi+(t) have impact on the change of positive trust over time. Follow-
ings are the equations when Ei(t) is 1, 0 and -1 respectively. 
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Notice that here in the case of negative experience positive trust is kept constant to 
avoid doubling the effect over all trust calculation as negative experience is accom-
modated fully in the negative trust calculation. In one formula this is expressed by: 
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In differential equation form this can be reformulated as: 
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Notice that this is a system of n coupled differential equations; the coupling is realised 
by τi+(t) which includes the sum of the different trust values for all j. Similarly, for 
negative trust followings are the equations when Ei(t) is -1, 0 and 1 respectively. 
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In one formula this is expressed as: 
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Notice that this again is a system of n coupled differential equations but not coupled 
to the system for the positive case described above. 
2.3   Combining Positive and Negative Trust in Overall Relative Trust 
The human’s total trust Ti(t) of CTi at time point t is a number between [-1, 1] where -
1 and 1 represent minimum and maximum values of the trust respectively. It is the 
difference of the human’s positive and negative trust of CTi at time point t: 
)()()( tTtTtT iii −+ −=  
In particular, also the human’s initial total trust of CTi at time point 0 is Ti(0) which is 
the difference of human’s initial trust Ti+(0)and distrust Ti–(0) in CTi at time point 0. 
2.4   Decision Model for Selection of a Trustee 
As the human’s total trust is a number in the interval [-1, 1], to calculate the request 
probability to request CTi at time point t (RPi(t)) the human’s total trust Ti(t) is first 
projected at the interval [0, 2] and then normalized as follows; 
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3   Simulation Results 
This section describes a case study to analyze the behavior of the model described in Sec-
tion 2. This case study analyzes the dynamics of a human’s total trust on the three com-
petitive Information Agents (IA’s). Several simulations were conducted in this case study. 
Few of the simulation results are presented in this and the next section. Other variations 
could be found in appendix A1. In this case study it is assumed that the human is bound to 
request one of the available competitive information agents at each time step. The prob-
ability of the human’s decision to request one of the information agents {IA1, IA2, IA3} at 
time t is based on the human’s total trust with each information agent respectively at time t 
{T1(t), T2(t), T3(t)} (i.e. the equation shown in Section 2.4). In response of the human’s 
request for information the agent gives an experience value Ei(t).  
3.1   Relativeness 
The first experiment described was conducted to observe the relativeness attribute of 
the model (see Figure 2). In the Figure, the x-axis represents time, whereas the y-axis 
represents the trust value for the various information providers. The configurations 
taken into the account are as shown in Table 1. 
It is evident from above graphs that the information agent who gives more positive 
experience gets more relative trust than the others, which can be considered a basic 
property of trust dynamics (trust monotonicity) [5] and [8]. 
                                                          
1
 http://www.cs.vu.nl/~mhoogen/trust/appendix-CIA-2008.pdf 
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 a)  
 b) 
 c) 
Fig. 2. Model Dependence on Amount of Positive Response from IAs: a) Information Agents 
IA1, IA2, IA3 give experience positive, random (equal probability to give a positive or negative 
experience), negative respectively on each request by the Human respectively. b) Information 
Agents IA1, IA2, IA3 give experience positive, positive, negative on each request by the Human 
respectively. c) Information Agents IA1, IA2, IA3 give experience positive, negative, negative 
on each request by the Human respectively. 
Table 1. Parameter values to analyze the dynamics of relative trust with the change in IAs 
responses 
Attribute Symbol Value 
Trust Decay γ 0.01 
Autonomy η 0.25 
Flexibility β 0.75 
Time Step ∆t 0.10 
Initial Trust and Distrust of 
{IA1,IA2,IA3} 
T1+(0), T2+(0), T3+(0), 
T1–(0), T2–(0), T3–(0) 
0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 
0.50, 0.50, 0.50 
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3.2   Trust Decay  
This second experiment, shown in Figure 3, was configured to observe the change in 
the total trust in relation to change in the trust decay attribute γ of the human. The 
configurations taken into the account are as shown in Table 2. 
 
 a) 
 b) 
   c) 
Fig. 3. Model Dependence on Trust Decay: a) γ = 0.01. b) γ = 0.05. c) γ = 0.10. 
Table 2. Parameter values to analyze the dynamics of relative trust with the change in trust 
decay (γ) 
Attribute Symbol Value 
Experience {IA1, IA2, IA3} E1, E2, E3 1, random, -1 
Autonomy η 0.25 
Flexibility β 0.75 
Time Step ∆t 0.10 
Initial Trust and Distrust of 
{IA1,IA2,IA3} 
T1+(0), T2+(0), T3+(0), 
T1–(0), T2–(0), T3–(0) 
0.50,0.50,0.50, 
0.50,0.50,0.50 
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In these cases also the information agent who gives more positive experience gets more 
relative trust than the others. Furthermore, if the trust decay is higher, then the trust value 
drops rapidly on no experience (see Figure 3c; more unsmooth fringes of the curve). 
3.3   Flexibility of Trust 
This experiment is configured to observe the change in the total trust with the change 
in the human’s flexibility of the trust (see Figure 4). Configurations taken into the 
account are shown in Table 3. 
 a) 
 b) 
 c) 
 d) 
Fig. 4. Model Dependence on Trust Flexibility: a) β = 1, b) β = 0.01, c) β = 0.00, d) β = 0.00 
and T1(0)=1, T2(0)=0, T3(0)=-1 
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Table 3. Parameter values to analyze the dynamics of relative trust with the change in  
flexibility (β) 
Attribute Symbol Value 
Experience {IA1, IA2, IA3} E1, E2, E3 1, random, -1 
Trust Decay γ 0.01 
Autonomy η 0.25 
Time Step ∆t 0.10 
Initial Trust and Distrust of 
{IA1,IA2,IA3} 
T1+(0), T2+(0), T3+(0), 
T1–(0), T2–(0), T3–(0) 
0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 
0.50, 0.50, 0.50 
 
 a) 
 b) 
 c) 
Fig. 5. Model Dependence on Trust Autonomy: a) η=1.0, b) η=0.50, c) η=0.00 
In these cases again the information agent who gives more positive experience gets 
more human’s relative trust then the others. Furthermore as the values of the β de-
crease the rate of change of the trust also decrease. In Figure 4c, β=0 which means 
that trust does not change on experiences at all, so the initial values retain for  
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experiences from the information agents hence trust value remains stable. Finally in the 
Figure 4d as initial values of the total trust are taken T1(0)=1, T2(0)=0 and T3(0)=-1 
instead of T1(0)=0, T2(0)=0 and T3(0)=0, so the total trust decays due to the trust 
decay factor and becomes stable after a specific time span. 
3.4   Autonomy of Trust 
This experiment (see Figure 5) is configured to observe the change in the human trust 
with the change in the human’s autonomy for the total trust calculation. Configura-
tions taken into the account are shown in Table 4. 
In these cases also the information agent who gives more positive experience gets more 
relative trust then the others. Further more as the values of the η decrease the human 
weights the relative part of the trust more than the autonomous trust. In Figure 5c, η=0 
which means that the human does not take into account the autonomous trust. This 
gives unstable patterns that are extremely sensitive to the initial conditions of the 
system. The example graph shown is just one of these patterns. 
Table 4. Parameter values to analyze the dynamics of relative trust with the change in 
autonomy (η) 
Attribute Symbol Value 
Experience {IA1, IA2, IA3} E1, E2, E3 1, random, -1 
Trust Decay γ 0.01 
Flexibility β 0.75 
Time Step ∆t 0.10 
Initial Trust and Distrust of 
{IA1,IA2,IA3} 
T1+(0), T2+(0), T3+(0), 
T1–(0), T2–(0), T3–(0) 
0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 
0.50, 0.50, 0.50 
3.5   Initial Trust and Distrust 
This experiment is configured to observe the change in the total trust with the change 
in the human’s initial trust and distrust (T+i(0), T-i(0)) on information agents (see 
Figure 6). Configurations taken into the account are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Parameter values to analyze the dynamics of relative trust with the change in initial 
trust 
Attribute Symbol Value 
Experience {IA1, IA2, IA3} E1, E2, E3 1, random, -1 
Trust Decay γ 0.01 
Autonomy η 0.25 
Flexibility β 0.75 
Time Step ∆t 0.10 
 
It is observed from the above graphs that the final outcome of the trust is not very 
sensitive for the initial values. 
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 a) 
 b) 
 c) 
Fig. 6. Model Dependence on Initial Trust {T1(0), T2(0), T3(0)}: a) 1, 1, -1. b) -1, 0, 1. c) 0, -1, 0 
4   Dynamics of Relative Trust in Different Cultures 
The degree of reliability of available information sources may strongly differ in different 
types of societies or cultures. In some types of societies it may be exceptional when an 
information source provides 10% or more false information, whereas in other types of 
societies it is more or less normal that around 50% of the outcomes of information 
sources is false. If the positive experiences percentage given by the information 
 
Table 6. Classification of Human Cultures with respect to the Positive Experiences given by 
the IAs 
Culture Name Percentage of the positive experiences by the 
information agents {IA1, IA2, IA3} 
A 100, 99, 95 
B 50, 40, 30 
C 10, 0, 0 
D 0,0,0 
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Table 7. Parameter values to analyze the Relative Trust Dynamics in different Cultures 
Attribute Symbol Value 
Trust Decay γ 0.01 
Autonomy η 0.25 
Flexibility β 0.75 
Time Step ∆t 0.10 
Initial Trust and Distrust of 
{IA1,IA2,IA3} 
T1+(0), T2+(0), T3+(0), 
T1–(0), T2–(0), T3–(0) 
0.50,0.50,0.50, 
0.50,0.50,0.50 
 a) 
 b) 
 c) 
 d) 
Fig. 7. Dynamics of Relative Trust in Different Cultures. a) Culture A, b) Culture B, c) Culture 
C, d) Culture D. 
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agents varies significantly, then the total relative trust of the human on the these in-
formation agents may differ as well. This case study was designed to study dynamics 
of the human’s trust on information agents in different cultures with respect to the 
percentages of the positive experiences they provide to the human. A main question is 
whether in a culture where most information sources are not very reliable, the trust in 
a given information source is higher than in a culture where the competitive informa-
tion sources are more reliable. Cultures are named with respect to percentage of the 
positive experiences provided by the information agents to the human as shown in 
Table 6 and other experimental configurations in Table 7.  
Simulation results for the dynamics of the relative trust for the cultures mentioned 
in Table 6 are shown in Figure 7. 
From Figure 7 it can be concluded that in every culture whatever relative percentage 
of the positive experiences may be (except when all information agent give negative 
experiences all of the time (see Figure 7d), the information agent that gives more posi-
tive experiences to the human gains more trust. Furthermore, the information agent that 
gives more positive experiences at least secure neutral trust (T(t)=0) in the long run, 
even the percentage of positive experiences is very low (see Figure 7c). 
5   Formal Analysis of the Model  
In this section a mathematical analysis is made of the change in trust upon positive 
(resp. negative) experiences. In Section 2 the differential equation form of the model 
for positive trust was formulated as: 
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One question that can be addressed is when for a given time point t an equilibrium oc-
curs, i.e. under which conditions trust does not change at time point t. Another question 
is under which circumstances trust will increase at t, and under which it will decrease. 
As the experience function Ei(t) is given by an external scenario, these questions have to 
be answered for a given value of this function. So, three cases are considered: 
 
Case 1:  Ei(t) = 1 
In this case the differential equation can be simplified to 
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It follows that 0)( ≥
+
dt
tdTi if and only if  
( ) 0)(*)(1*1
1
)(
≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∑−−−
+
+
=
+
tTtT i
n
tT
i
n
j j
ηη  
or    
1)( =+ tTi  
 
For Ti+(t) < 1 this is equivalent to (with: ∑=
=
+n
j j tTtS 1 )()( ) 
 ( ) ηη ≤⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−
+
+
)(*)(1*1 )( tT
tT
i
n
tS
i
 
( ) ( ) )(*)(*)(*)(*1 tStTtTntS ii ηη ≤−− ++  ( ) ( )ηη −≤− ++ 1)(*)(*)(*)( 2 tStTntTtS ii  
( ) 01)(*)(*)()(* 2 ≥−+− ++ ηη tStTtStTn ii  
 
This quadratic expression in Ti+(t) has no zeros when the discriminant 
( )η
η
−
−
1
*)(*4)( 2 tSntS  is negative: 
( ) ( ) η
η
η
η
η
η
−
<<⇔<⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−⇔<
−
−
1
4)(00
1
*4)()(0
1
*)(*4)( 2 ntSntStStSntS  
 
When η > 0.2 then 1/η < 5 and therefore 1/η - 1< 4, hence (1-η ) /η < 4 which can 
be reformulated as 4η /(1-η )> 1. As S(t)/n ≤ 1, this shows that for η > 0.2 as long as 
S(t) is positive, the discriminant is always negative, and therefore upon a positive 
experience there will always be an increase. When S(t) = 0, which means all trust 
values are 0, no change occurs. For the case the discriminant is ≥0, i.e., S(t)/n ≥ 4η 
/(1-η ) then the quadratic equation Ti+(t) for has two zeros symmetric in S(t): 
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In this case increase upon a positive experience will take place for Ti+(t) less than the 
smaller zero or higher than the larger zero, and not between the zeros. An equilibrium 
occurs upon a positive experience when Ti+(t) = 1 or when equality holds:  
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This only can happen when the discriminant is not negative, in which case equilibria 
occur for Ti+(t) equal to one of the zeros. 
 
Case 2: Ei(t) = 0 
In this case the differential equation can be simplified to 
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So, in this case positive trust is decreasing or has in equilibrium with positive trust 0. 
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Case 3: Ei(t) = -1 
In this case the differential equation can be simplified to 
0)( =
+
dt
tdTi
 
So, for this case always an equilibrium occurs in t for positive trust. 
For negative trust, the situation is a mirror image of the case for positive trust, and 
by combining the positive and negative trust, the patterns for overall trust can be 
analysed. 
6   Discussion 
This paper has introduced a model for relative trust to enable personal assistant agents 
to give the appropriate support to humans. Within the model several parameters have 
been introduced to tailor it towards a particular human. The influence of these pa-
rameters upon the trust has been extensively shown in this paper by means of simula-
tions, even including different cultural settings. Finally, a mathematical analysis has 
been conducted to formally derive what the change of the trust functions is in case of 
positive and negative experiences. 
A variety of trust models have been proposed in the literature [4] and [5]. These 
trust models attempt to determine the level of trust in certain agents based upon ex-
periences. They do however not take into account the notion of relativeness of this 
trust. Models have been proposed for relative trust as well. In [9] a model is presented 
that allows an agent to combine multiple sources for deriving a trust value. This no-
tion of relativeness differs from the notion used in this paper. [10] extends an existing 
trust model of [11] with the notion of relative trust. They take as a basis certain trust 
values determined by the model [11], and compare these values in order to make 
statements about different trust values for different agents. In determining the trust 
itself, they do not incorporate the experiences with other agents that can perform 
similar tasks, which is done in this paper. In [12] a trust model is utilized to allocate 
decision support tasks. In the model, relative trust is addressed as well but again not 
incorporated in the calculation of the trust value itself. 
For future work, an interesting option is to see how well the parameters of the model 
can be derived by a personal assistant (based upon the requests outputted by the human). 
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